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Prizes, Patents, and Technology Procurement:  
A Proposed Analytical Framework 
Timothy J. Brennan,  Molly Macauley, and Kate Whitefoot 
Abstract 
Prizes are receiving increasing attention in policy  and entrepreneurial communities  as means to 
promote innovation,  but their distinguishing  features remain inadequately understood. Models of patents 
treat winning  a patent as winning  a prize; other models distinguish  prizes primarily  as public lump-sum 
(re)purchase of a patent. We examine advantages of prizes based on the ability  to customize rewards, 
manage competition,  generate publicity,  and cover achievements otherwise not patentable. We propose a 
two-dimensional  comparative framework based first on whether the procuring party knows its needs and 
technology,  its needs but not its technology, or neither. The second dimension  is the risk that the 
investment in research will prove profitable,  where the greater the risk, the more the procuring party 
should share in it through ex ante cost coverage or payment commitment. Such a framework may be 
extended to cover other means of technology inducement, including  grants, customized procurement, and 
off-the-shelf purchase.  
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Prizes, Patents, and Technology Procurement:  
A Proposed Analytical Framework 
Timothy J. Brennan,  Molly Macauley, and Kate Whitefoot  
“She said she later found a note he‟d written about the award, which he 
was pleased to learn was officially called a prize. Because? „Because,‟ said Kelly, 
with perfect Carlinesque timing, „because he said an award is what grown-ups 
win. A prize is something a kid wins.‟” 
—The Washington Post, quoting  Kelly Carlin  on the Twain  Prize 
for American  Humor awarded posthumously  to her father, George 
(Farhi 2008) 
Introduction 
Prizes are receiving  increasing  attention  in policy  and entrepreneurial  communities  as 
means to promote innovation.  Among  the most publicized  prizes in recent years was the $10 
million  Ansari  X Prize that Burt Rutan and Scaled Composites won in 2004 for building  a craft 
that could fly a person into suborbital  flight  (100 kilometers  up) twice within  two weeks.
2 
Another was the $1 million  prize awarded by Netflix  in 2009 for improving  by 10 percent the 
accuracy of its system for recommending  films  to its customers.
3  In 2010, three teams won the 
$10 million  Progressive  Insurance Automotive  X Prize for constructing  cars (in three different 
classes) that ―achieved  100 miles  per gallon  in real-world  driving.‖
4 
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2 X Prize  Foundation, ―Ansari X Prize,‖  http://space.xprize.org/ansari-x-prize,  accessed March 26, 2011.   
3 Viewer  enjoyment predictions are based on prior ratings of the film  in question and other films the ra ting 
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The X Prize Foundation,  which  facilitates  donor and commercial  prize sponsorships,  also 
is running  a number of other prizes, including: 
  The $10 million  Archon Genomics  X Prize ―to the first team that can build  a device and 
use it to sequence 100 human  genomes  within  10 days or less, with  an accuracy of no 
more than one error in every 100,000 bases sequenced, with  sequences accurately 
covering  at least 98% of the genome,  and at a recurring  cost of no more than $10,000 per 
genome.‖
5 
  The Wendy Schmidt  Oil Cleanup X Challenge,  offering  an award of $1.4 million  to the 
team ―that demonstrates  the ability  to recover oil on the sea surface at the highest  oil 
recovery rate and the highest  oil recovery efficiency.‖
6   
  The Google Lunar X Prize, for which  a ―total of $30 million  in prizes are available  to the 
first  privately  funded teams to safely  land a robot on the surface of the Moon and have 
that robot travel 500 meters over the lunar  surface and send images  and data back to the 
Earth.‖
7 
Interest in prizes  goes beyond these private-sector  examples.  The U.S. Department  of 
Energy  (DOE) is sponsoring  the L Prize that ―will  award significant  cash prizes, plus 
opportunities  for federal  purchasing  agreements,  utility  programs, and other incentives,‖  to the 
winner  of a competition  to develop a high-efficiency  replacement  for the 60 watt incandescent 
bulb.
8 DOE is also funding  and managing  a million  dollar  H Prize for ―advanced materials  for 
hydrogen  storage‖  (DOE 2009). The National  Aeronautics  and Space Administration  has a 
number  of ―challenge‖  prize competitions  with  awards of $1 million–$2  million  for tethering 
materials,  small  (down to one kilogram)  satellite  launches,  wireless  electric  power transmission, 
and an aircraft  that could fly  200 miles  in less than two hours at less than one gallon  of fuel  per 
                                                 
5 ―Archon Genomics X Prize,‖  http://genomics.xprize.org/archon-x-prize-for-genomics/prize-overview,  accessed 
Mar. 17, 2011. 
6 ―Wendy Schmidt Oil Cleanup X Challenge,‖ http://www.iprizecleanoceans.org/Page/Home,  accessed March 17, 
2011. 
7 ―Google Lunar X Prize,‖  http://www.googlelunarxprize.org/lunar/about-the-prize,  accessed March 17, 2011. 
8 Department of Energy, ―L Prize Competition Overview,‖  http://www.lightingprize.org/overview.stm,  accessed 
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occupant.
9 Newell and Wilson (2005) propose the use of public-sector  prizes to encourage 
technological  breakthroughs  to reduce greenhouse  gas emissions  and mitigate  climate  change. 
Interest in prizes is not novel. In 1714, the British  government  offered cash prizes for the 
development  of clocks sufficiently  precise to facilitate  navigation  over the oceans, and the 
French government  in the 18
th century offered 100,000 francs  to the first person who could 
extract soda from sea salt.
10 Charles Lindbergh‘s  first  solo transatlantic  flight  in 1927 earned him 
the $25,000 Orteig Prize. Rogerson  (1989) suggests  that the added profit  from cost-plus 
payments  in defense contracts constitutes  a prize for innovation.  Macauley  (2005) details  the use 
of prizes  offered by the public  and private  sectors, in the early history  of automobiles,  aviation, 
and rocketry.  
Prizes offered by governments  reflect  decisions  to augment  other policies  to promote 
innovation.  In 2006, Congress passed legislation  requiring  that the National  Science Foundation 
(NSF) to create a program of prizes  to induce  innovations.
11  The Committee  on the Design of an 
NSF Innovation  Prize of the National Research Council  (NRC) strongly  supported this idea, 
saying  that ―an ambitious  program of innovation  inducement  prize contests will  be a sound 
investment  in strengthening  the infrastructure  for U.S. innovation‖  (NRC, 2007, 2). This 
committee  proposed that NSF begin  with  ―small-scale‖  prizes of $200,000–$2 million  and begin 
planning  for prizes up to $30 million  (NRC 2007, 3). In setting  up these prizes, the committee 
recommended  that they be ―designed  around objectively  measurable  outcomes‖  to minimize 
controversy  and preferred a ―first-past-the-post‖  design,  with  awards to the first  person or group 
to meet those incomes,  over a ―best-in-class‖  design  where the prize goes to the person or group 
with the best-performing  entry by a specified  date (NRC 2007, 5).  
Interest in innovation  prizes also extends to the executive  branch. The Obama 
administration  has created a website, challenge.gov,  to list and promote the use of prizes 
throughout  the federal government.  Thomas Kalil,  deputy assistant  for technology  and economic 
policy  in the Clinton  administration  and currently  deputy director for policy  at the Office of 
Science and Technology  Policy,  has advocated expanding  the use of prizes  (Kalil  2006).
12 He 
                                                 
9 ―All Federal Government Challenges,‖ http://challenge.gov/search?order=prize, accessed March 17, 2011. 
10 X-Prize  Foundation, ―Incentivized Competition Heritage,‖ http://www.xprize.org/x-prizes/incentivized-
competition-heritage, accessed March 18, 2011. 
11 Science, State, Justice, Commerce  and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Public Law 109-108). 
12 He includes government purchase commitments with prizes.   Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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found that prizes  allow innovators  to discover the best way of meeting  a specified  objective, 
rather than have it be determined  in advance through  a research grant. Using  prizes  also opens 
the process to new innovators  and those who would not want to deal with  public  procurement 
requirements  (Kalil  2006, 6–7; see also Newell and Wilson  2005). Kalil  also notes that the 
publicity  value  of a prize could lead to investments  to win the prize that far exceed the prize 
itself.  For example,  the $10 million  Ansari  X Prize for suborbital  flight  stimulated  more than 
$100 million  in private investment  (Kalil  2006, 6–7, citing  Diamandis  2006). He suggests  that 
improved  energy  efficiency,  vaccines,  and disease-resistant  plants and animals  are all amenable 
to prize competitions  (Kalil  2006, 9). 
This attention  invites  the question  of why one should  use prizes when there are other 
means to encourage  innovation.  Most notable among them is the patent, in which  the first 
successful  inventor  of a product or process acquires an exclusive  right  to produce that product or 
employ  that process generally  for 20 years from the filing  date.
13 Private parties or government 
agencies could also induce innovation  through off-the-shelf  procurement  or purchase through 
contract. Increased demand for solutions  to particular  needs should  influence  supply of 
innovations  through  the market. Innovation  solicitors  can also issue requests for proposals in 
which they fund the research, and such proposals may leave it to the proposers to define the 
innovation  they seek funding  to pursue.  
Although  there have been studies of different  means for inducing  innovation,  formal 
analysis  of instrument  choice still  awaits an adequate framework. Perhaps the most significant 
indicator  of the need for such a framework is that virtually  all models of patents treat winning  a 
patent and winning  a prize as formally  equivalent,  making  it impossible  to distinguish  reasons 
for choosing one over the other. In these models, winning  a patent is equivalent  to winning  a 
prize equal to the expected discounted present value of the profits flowing  from the patent, as in 
the literature  reviewed by Scotchmer (2004, 98–123). In direction  of equating  prizes with 
patents, Rogerson  (1989) characterizes  profit from  cost-plus defense contracting  as an 
innovation-inducing  prize, but it is not a lump  sum; the rewards are akin to what would be 
obtained under a patent for the defense-related  innovation,  were there a market for it.  
                                                 
13 35 U.S.C.  102,  154(a)(2).  The term of a patent may be extended to take into account regulatory review, 
particularly for pharmaceuticals. 35 U.S.C.  155,  156. The term of a design patent is fourteen years. 35 U.S.C.  173. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
5 
A few researchers have analyzed  prizes and similar  instruments,  but these studies  have 
not addressed the distinction  between prizes and patents. Nalebuff  and Stiglitz  (1983) discuss 
prizes—not  in contrast to patents but in the broader and somewhat  related context of whether  to 
base worker compensation  on absolute or relative  performance.  Fullerton  and McAfee (1999) 
examine  using  an entry auction  to restrict  participation  to the most efficient  contestants  for a 
prize to avoid fixed-cost  duplication;  Giebe (2010) looks at entry auctions  where increasing  the 
number  of participants  increases  the expected number  of innovations.   
Most of the analyses  distinguishing  patents and prizes builds  on a theme put forth in 
Wright  (1983), in which  the reward to innovators  in a patent comes from the ability  to charge a 
price over marginal  cost for each use of the process or unit  of the product, while  a prize is a 
lump-sum  payment  that does not induce  the same marginal  distortions.  This  approach is 
particularly  attractive  to health  economists  concerned with providing  drugs in poor countries  at 
very low marginal  cost rather than allowing  much  higher  patent-protected prices to make the 
drugs effectively  unavailable.  Shavell  and van Ypersele (2001) supported this view, finding  that 
the likely  advantage  of the patent system in being able to exploit  the private information  of the 
innovator  regarding  value is balanced by the average gain  in efficiency  from using  what they call 
―rewards,‖  which  in this  vein are similar  to prizes. Weyl and Tirole  (2010) have designed  a 
mechanism  combining  an allowed  fraction  of monopoly  rents to exploit  that private  information 
and an up-front  prize to reward innovation  to reduce the deadweight  losses from monopoly  rents.  
Kremer (1998) observed that because their profits  extend over time,  patents induce  rivals 
to come up with  inventions  to capture those rents without  producing  additional  consumer 
surplus,  leading  to wasteful  innovative  effort. He proposed a prize-like  scheme for lump-sum 
buyouts  of patents to avoid wasteful  effort.
14 In the scheme, private parties would solicit  bids for 
the patent, the government  would multiply  the bid by a mark-up factor exceeding  one and offer 
the patent holder the high  bid times the mark-up factor; the patent holder would then choose 
whether to sell or keep the patent.
15 The mark-up factor is provided to address adverse selection 
created when patent holders know the value of the patent but bidders do not, and it is worthwhile 
for the government  to pay it because the social value of the patent exceeds its private value. To 
                                                 
14 Hopenhayn et. al. (2006)  proposed a mandatory buyout scheme to reduce distortions the patent system imposes 
on incentives for successive innovations. 
15 Shavell and van Ypersele (2001, 530–31)  found that allowing the innovator to choose between keeping a patent 
and taking a buyout ―unambiguously‖ dominates using patents alone. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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induce  bidders to reveal their  information  on the patent‘s market value,  some fraction  of the 
patents would be randomly  sold to the high  bidder at the price they bid.  
In our view, the experience  with and policy  advocacy for prizes  indicates  that they have 
little  if anything  to do with the patent-buyout  rationale  prevalent  in the literature.  The following 
section expands on some of the problems  with  designing  and implementing  a patent-buyout 
scheme in light  of when and how prize programs  have been instituted.  This leads to a discussion 
in the subsequent  section of what may be called idiosyncratic  arguments  for prizes, exemplified 
(not facetiously)  by George Carlin‘s  reported observation  regarding  the Mark Twain  Prize.  
We call these explanations  for prizes ―idiosyncratic‖  not because they are unimportant, 
but because they do not fit within  the general  framework  we propose in the penultimate  section 
to compare prizes with patents and other means of technology  inducement,  including  contracts, 
grants, and standard procurement.  This  framework  is built  on two dimensions.  The first  is the 
degree to which  the procuring  party knows what it wants:  it may know its needs and technology, 
its needs but not its technology,  or neither.  The second dimension  is risk that the investment  in 
research will  prove profitable,  where the greater the risk, the more the procuring  party should 
share in it through  ex ante payments.  For example,  patents are more likely  to be appropriate 
instruments  when needs are not known but when potential  innovators  are the most efficient 
bearers of risk, while  prizes are likely  to be better when the needs can be specified,  necessary or 
preferred technological  solutions  are not known, and the procuring  party needs to share the risk 
by guaranteeing  a minimum  return to the first  successful  innovator.  This  framework  should 
facilitate  not only  theoretical  advances in understanding  innovation  instrument  choice, but also 
empirical  tests of the comparative  effectiveness  of these instruments  in different  information 
settings. 
Patent Buyouts Are Not Prizes 
There are four primary  reasons why the patent-buyout  theory prevalent  in the literature 
does little  if anything  to explain  prizes.
16 First, prizes generally  do not require transfer of a 
patent. Government  prizes allow the winning  innovators  to retain patent rights so removing 
market distortions  of patents is clearly  not a priority  with these prizes. Patent buyouts do not 
                                                 
16 A fifth may be that the private sector offers prizes, while government would purchase patent rights to make a 
good available to the public at large at marginal  cost. Private parties could have similar  motivations on charitable 
grounds, as discussed in the section on idiosyncratic reasons for prizes. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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seem to be in the interest  of the private  donors who fund many  of the prizes noted in the 
introduction—the  winners  of the X Prizes typically  do not have to transfer  patents to the 
donors—perhaps with  the exception  of prizes for vaccines  and treatments  to prevent the spread 
of diseases plaguing  the poorest parts of the globe.
17 For commercial  prizes, such as the Netflix 
prize, Netflix  surely obtains the rights  to use any patented processes coming  from the search for 
better methods of predicting  movie preferences, but the patent and any attendant monopoly 
profits do not disappear.  
Second, prizes in practice seem to be implemented  only in very specific  contexts. As 
Kalil (2006, 20) and other policy advocates for prizes have noted, they are adopted only in 
contexts where one can specify  precise ―victory  conditions.‖  To prevent litigation  and 
bureaucratic  abuse, as described by Abramowicz  (2003) in his critique  of patent buyouts,  one 
needs clear criteria  for winning  the prize. These criteria  can be either  the first  person or team to 
meet a specified  goal, or the person or team that performs the best by a date certain, where 
performance  can be defined  without  ambiguity.  This  emphasizes  the informational  hurdles  in 
attempting  to replace the patent system with  a buyout program:  patents reward innovation  that 
may never have been imagined,  much  less amenable  to reward estimation,  by anyone other than 
the inventor.   
The third reason why the patent-buyout  theory does not explain  the prevalence  of prizes 
relates to the difficulty  of implementing  a reward system  in place of patents. As alluded  to above, 
the patent-buyout  story holds in two circumstances:  First, as in Shavell  and van Ypersele (2001), 
the patent system could be preempted by a reward system that provides  the inventor  with  the 
expected surplus  from the invention,  where the expectation  is taken over the distribution  of 
possible demand curves for a successful  invention.  Second, as Kremer (1998) and Shavell  and 
van Ypersele (2001) consider, the government  is prepared to purchase the patent at a price at 
least as great as the profit the patent holder would expect to get from the exclusive  right  to sell 
the product or license  the process at the profit-maximizing  price, presumably  above marginal 
cost. 
The difficulties  with  instituting  prizes as fixed-price  substitutes  for patents are akin, and 
in some ways worse, to the related problems  with substituting  lump-sum  taxes for per unit  or ad 
valorem  taxes. For the tax comparison,  although  lump-sum  taxes eliminate  the distortions 
                                                 
17 For more on donor-supported prizes, see McKinsey and Co. (2009). Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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associated with commodity  or sales taxes, structuring  them so they are revenue  equivalent  on a 
per-taxpayer basis requires knowing  what the taxpayer would have paid under the relatively 
inefficient  tax structure.  If the lump-sum  taxes do not take actual payments  into account, there 
will  be distributional  consequences.  If they do, they replicate  the distortions  they were intended 
to eliminate. 
We can apply this analogy  to the choice of public  patent buyouts  over privately  held 
patents, but with the added wrinkle  that a discrepancy  between an ex ante reward and an ex post 
patent value  creates its own set of deadweight  losses. The problem is not merely  distributional. 
As Wright  (1983, 691–92) pointed out in his initial  formal  analysis  of the benefits  of patent 
buyouts: 
It is further  necessary to specify  that the terms of the award must be fixed 
before this information  imbalance  [between the patent holder and the government 
providing  the reward] is resolved, if it can ever be economically  resolved.  Several 
arguments  for this assumption  are presented …; if it does not hold, any rationale 
presented here for choosing  patents over other incentives  with lower excess 
burden collapses. 
Shavell  and van Ypersele (2001, 535–37), who otherwise  largely  supporting  a reward 
system, found  that a patent system  could outperform  a reward system because a reward will 
induce  too much  investment  in low-value  patents and too little  investment  in high  value patents.   
Abramowicz  (2003) notes practical  difficulties  if the rewards are provided after the 
innovation  takes place. In his view, leaving  discretion  on the size of the awards to government 
agencies  invites  the well-known  disparities  between political  and economic  optima associated 
with bureaucratic  discretion.  He suggests  that the government  could take patents with  just 
compensation,  but that leaves determination  of the prize to courts, where neither  certainty  nor 
expertise  may be ensured.
18 He also points out that trying  to estimate the value of a patent is 
problematic  because in many cases, a patent is not a product with a particular  demand curve but 
an input used in conjunction  with many other patented products. Even for pharmaceuticals, 
                                                 
18 Still,  attracted by the elimination  of deadweight losses in an ideal patent-buyout system, Abramowicz  (2003) 
proposes to deal with bureaucratic efficiency by having Congress appropriate funds for this purpose and set up an 
agency that would not go into effect for 10 years. Abramowicz  suggests that those choosing to begin a research 
effort today will  be unable to predict the particular bureaucratic bias in an agency ten years from now and thus will 
have no incentive to distort their research efforts to exploit that bias. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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where the patent protects a specific  product, Wei (2007) points out that estimating  a demand 
curve in advance to figure  out the right  prize will  be difficult.   
A useful  analogy  may be a fixed-payment  system  substitute  for copyright.  In theory, 
making  information  available  at its marginal  cost, essentially  zero, increases  its distribution 
throughout  society  with perhaps a variety  of non-economic  benefits,  as well  as efficiency  gains. 
However, having  an agency  or court decide which  authors, filmmakers,  and songwriters  should 
get funded seems a process likely  to be fraught  with error. The similar  advantage  of patents over 
a buyout  system or prizes  is that intellectual  property is largely  content neutral;  other than the 
market, one does not have a gatekeeper deciding  which  projects merit  funding  and which  do not. 
The example  of copyright  supports another observation  by Wei (2007) that a patent buyout 
reduces the incentive  to expand the market for the patent after the reward or prize has been 
received.
19 
Fourth and most fundamentally,  the argument  for looking  at prizes as a form of patent 
buyout rest on the assumption  that a patent buyout, if perfectly implemented,  is distortion  free. 
All these arguments  ignore the distortions  in the taxes necessary to generate the revenues needed 
to fund these patent buyouts. In some circumstances  they may be less distortionary  than patent 
markups, but this is not obviously  the case, particularly  given pre-existing  distortions  in the 
economy and the size of taxes needed to reproduce the rewards provided by the patent system.
20 
Moreover, as Wei (2007) and Kremer (1998) exemplify,  much of the interest in patent buyouts 
arises from considering  the health and social benefits  of being able to distribute  pharmaceuticals 
at marginal  production  cost rather than have them priced out of reach by monopoly  mark-ups. 
The demand for drugs to treat serious health conditions  is likely  to be at least as inelastic  as the 
supply of labor, financial  capital, and other items that would be taxed even more to cover the 
cost of these rewards.  
In short, if one is looking  for an explanation  for prizes over patents, such an explanation 
will  have little  if anything  to do with the putative efficiency  properties of publicly  provided 
                                                 
19 An even more general argument may be Hayek‘s (1945)  on the informational  advantages of decentralized markets 
over central planning.  
20 A useful comparison may be taxes to internalize externalities associated with climate change. Parry and Williams 
(2011)  find that such taxes increase aggregate economic welfare only if the revenues are used to reduce income and 
payroll taxes because carbon taxes, by raising the price of goods, exacerbate the reduction in labor income under the 
existing tax structure.  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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lump-sum  payments  for the rights  to use innovations  at marginal  cost. The inability  to design  a 
practical  system  of patent buyouts  suggests  that the purpose of prizes is not simply  as an 
alternative  payment  mechanism  within  the patent system.  One alternative  explanation  is that 
prizes are employed  when patents themselves  may not perform  very well,  if at all. We review 
some of the particular  reasons why private and public  enterprises  have turned to prizes in the 
next two sections.  
Idiosyncratic Advantages of Prizes 
The specificity  and rarity of prizes relative  to patents and the related operational  limits  to 
the patent-buyout  rationale  suggest  other reasons why prizes may be adopted. Before proposing  a 
framework  for comparing  different  means of technology  inducement  based on the ex ante 
knowledge  regarding  the potential  innovation  and the optimal  allocation  of risk, we look first  at 
some particular  advantages  prizes may have in some contexts  over patents. 
Publicity 
A mundane  but not dismissible  consideration  is that, as George Carlin  observed, people 
like to win prizes  and be known as prize winners.  It can be fun to win a contest. This rationale 
may pertain when a prize could be won by coming  up with  an idea in one‘s spare time  or 
building  a prototype in a garage with  inexpensive  materials.  The private value  of prizes can 
attract those who might  not otherwise  consider  commercial  efforts,  expanding  the pool of 
potential  innovators  (Kalil  2006, 7; McKinsey  and Co. 2009, 23–24). These benefits  may show 
up in spending,  for example,  in that the contestants  for the Ansari X Prize for suborbital  flight 
reportedly  spent $100 million  to claim  a $10 million  prize.
21  This may also be the case when 
winners  of the prize get not only the satisfaction  of winning  as such, but also any satisfaction 
from contributions  their invention  may make to solving  a significant  social problem, as for 
example  the student teams participating  in the Department  of Energy‘s  Solar Decathalon  contest 
to come up with  the best design  for an affordable,  completely  solar-powered house.
22  
                                                 
21 X Prize  Foundation, ―Ansari X Prize,‖  n. 1 supra. Of course, this could also be evidence of waste in the design of 
the prize contest as well. 
22 U.S. Department of Energy Solar Decathalon, http://www.solardecathlon.gov/competition.html, accessed March 
25, 2011; Templeton, (2007). Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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However, it does not seem reasonable  to count on intrinsic  publicity  or a sense of 
contributing  to the social  good as generally  sufficient  to encourage  efficienct  investment.  The 
willingness  to spend what it takes to participate  in a contest to produce a car that gets 100 miles 
per gallon  of gasoline  or fly  someone into suborbital  flight  twice in two weeks is not likely  to be 
sustained  by the satisfaction  of winning  alone. One would then want to look at commercial 
benefits.  Publicity  can serve a commercial  informational  function  similar  to advertising.  As 
McKinsey  and Co. (2009,19) observed: 
Well-designed  prizes  carry a strong element  of theater that makes them 
newsworthy  and media friendly.  This  messaging  and brand-building  potential  is 
attractive  to corporations  looking  to burnish  their  image  or wealthy  donors 
seeking  to signal  their arrival. 
Penin (2005) argued that patents serve as signals  of ability  and capacity for innovative 
thinking;  a highly  publicized  prize seems an even clearer signal.  Because the publicity  value of 
prizes depends on their relative  infrequency,  some observers have noted the potential  for ―prize 
fatigue,‖  reducing  the willingness  of potential  innovators  to participate  in any given  prize 
competition  (Hill  2004).  
Reward Flexibility 
The patent system has only a ―one-size-fits-all‖  solution  to induce  innovation:  it provides 
the first inventor  with an exclusive,  transferable  right  to produce the invention  or use the process 
(Scotchmer  2004,117) A prize, on the other hand, can be designed  in any number  of ways to 
induce  innovation.   
In the qualitatively  similar  context of inducing  workers to exert effort to achieve  a goal, 
Nalebuff  and Stiglitz  (1983) emphasize  flexibility  as the primary  advantage  of prizes, 
tournaments,  and relative  compensation  schemes over simple  piece-rate or fixed-salary 
compensation.  The Netflix  Prize embodied this flexibility.  Along  with  the $1 million  prize for 
the first prediction  algorithm  meeting  its criteria,  it awarded annual  $50,000 ―Progress  Prizes‖ 
until  there was a grand-prize  winner  to the team that had improved  the most on the best result  in 
the prior year.
23  
                                                 
23 The Netflix  Prize Rules, http://www.netflixprize.com//rules,  accessed March 24, 2011. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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With Nalebuff  and Stiglitz‘s  (1983) analysis  of worker contests as a model, the flexibility 
of prizes  relative  to patents may be manifested  along  other dimensions.  One can give prizes to 
contestants  coming  in second or other positions  to provide more encouragement.  This  strategy is 
particularly  useful  when participants  view winning  as a low probability  because either  the 
number  of contestants  or the chance that no effort will  be successful  is large.
24  
One could also award the winning  prize only if there is a substantial  gap between the first 
and second place finisher‘s  performance.  This design  can induce  more effort by reducing  the 
chance that winning  is a matter of luck. More generally,  the prize could be based on relative 
performance,  not just on whether  someone won but by how much better they did than their 
competitors.  Taking  advantage  of these last possibilities  in an innovation  prize contest would 
require a clear measure of how the gap will  be measured,  supporting  either  a ―best-in-class‖ 
approach, where all entries are evaluated  at a pre-specified  date, or a substantial  second prize to 
keep contestants  in the race after a winner  has been selected.   
Contestant Management 
Those holding  contests for prizes  have ample opportunities  to maximize  the benefits  of 
cooperation  and minimize  duplication  by managing  the contestants.  As noted above, they can 
hold entry auctions  to recapture potential  surplus  from setting  the prize too high  and, more 
important,  limit  the competition  to contestants  with  the largest  expected chance of success. To 
reduce the duplication  of effort—also  a problem with  patents; hence the term ―patent race,‖ as 
described in Baye and Hoppe (2003)—contest  holders can encourage  information  sharing  and 
consolidation  among  research teams. They are in the best position  to balance the risks that 
information  sharing  will  impede competition  by dissipating  advantages  to private  parties and the 
gains  from the possibility  that information  sharing  would increase the likelihood  or speed of 
meeting  the objective.
25   
                                                 
24 Multiple prizes could also replicate the gains from having multiple  innovations, where the second has some value 
but less than the first, etc.  
25 For its prize, Netflix  provided a discussion board where competitors could and did share information regarding 
their progress in finding algorithms to improve predictions of movie preferences (Thompson 2008). Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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Learning from Failure 
Not all prizes contests produce a winner,  but they still  may be valuable  because 
information  may be gleaned  when a prize is not awarded. Failure  to win suggests  at some gross 
level  that the offered prize was insufficient  to stimulate  the necessary  investment  for the desired 
outcome. Contestants  who almost  win reveal the state of the art. As a result, prizes  allow one to 
trace out a supply curve, or at least a few points on it, and thus provide information  for the 
contest holder about innovative  capacity  to solve the problem at hand. One may be able to make 
similar  inferences  from failure  to develop patents in a particular  area—for example,  orphan 
drugs—with  either too few potential  beneficiaries  overall  or too few with sufficient  income  to be 
willing  to cover the cost of development.  Prizes, however, allow  one to put a specific  number  on 
a value  insufficient  to stimulate  successful  solutions  to an identified  problem.
26   
Non-Patentability 
From the contexts  in which  prizes have been implemented,  the most striking  if not crucial 
idiosyncratic  difference  between prizes and patents is that prizes can be and are employed  for all 
sorts of achievements,  where patents can be granted only  to what is patentable  under the law. 
Under U.S. patent law, a patent can be obtained for ―any new and useful  process, machine, 
manufacture,  or composition  of matter, or any new or useful  improvement  thereof.‖
27  To meet 
this test, ―the differences  between the subject matter sought  to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would [not] have been obvious  at the time  the invention 
was made to a person having  ordinary  skill  in the art to which  said subject matter pertains.‖
28 
With some variation  for designs  or pharmaceuticals  because of the time  it takes for Federal Drug 
Administration  approval, the exclusive  right  granted by a patent extends 20 years from the date 
of application.
29   
Determining  whether the subject matter proposed for a patent is ―new and useful‖  and 
nonobvious  to someone with  ordinary  skill  in the prior art is the task of the examiners  in the U.S. 
                                                 
26 On the other hand, patents reveal the value of the innovation in the market and thus may provide signals regarding 
demand for additional innovations, akin to Demsetz‘s (1964)  argument for charging positive tolls for bridges even 
when the marginal  cost of using them is zero, to garner information as to how valuable the bridge is.  
27 35 U.S.C. 101.   
28 35 U.S.C. 103(a).   
29 35 U.S.C.  154(a)(2).  Note that this reinforces the argument that patents are a ―one-size-fits-most‖ approach to 
inducing innovation, while prizes can be customized to fit the situation at hand. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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Patent and Trademark Office.
30  Most relevant  to prizes, however, is the determination  of whether 
something  is a ―process, machine,  manufacture,  or composition  of matter.‖  In 2010, the Supreme 
Court in Bilski v. Kappos affirmed  a Federal Circuit  Court of Appeals ruling  that to be 
patentable,  the subject matter must be connected to something  tangible,  specifically  that it either 
be ―tied to a particular  machine  or apparatus‖ or transform  ―a particular  article  into a different 
state or thing.‖
  31 This  overturned  the Federal Circuit‘s  1998 State Street Bank ruling  that 
something  need only ―produce a ‗useful,  concrete, and tangible  result‘‖  to be eligible  for a 
patent.
32 State Street Bank led to the patenting  of a range of business  processes, most notoriously 
Amazon.com‘s  ―one-click‖  online  ordering  (Stobbs 2003, 10–17). Prior to State Street Bank, 
business  methods  were difficult  if not impossible  to patent; failed  attempts included  drive-
through  windows  in fast food restaurants  and drive-in  movies  (Stobbs 2003, 4–10). 
More generally  and less controversially  in legal  terms, the idea of solving  a problem  is 
not patentable.  One cannot patent the idea of a solo flight  to Europe, suborbital  flight,  fuel 
efficiency  of 100 miles  per gallon,  rapid sequencing  of human  genomes,  and recovery of spilled 
oil—all  subjects of prizes described above—only  a particular  process or device to do them. The 
winners  of the prizes for these activities  may well have patented machines  or processes along the 
way that will  allow them to exploit  their particular  solutions.  But unlike  a prize, a patent system 
cannot provide a monetary  incentive  just for solving  the task alone. Consequently,  developers 
may not have been able to patent the prediction  methods rewarded by the Netflix  Prize, although 
State Street Bank was controlling  law at the time.
33   
The Matrix, Loaded 
These idiosyncratic  advantages  of prizes,  rather than the potential  theoretical  advantages 
of patent buyouts,  provide considerable  insight  into why and when prizes might  be preferable  to 
patents for fostering  innovation.  However, recognizing  two fundamental  differences  between 
prizes and patents may not only improve  our sense of when one might  be preferred to another. 
                                                 
30 Under U.S. law, a patent goes to the first inventor, not the first person to file for a patent, so the person who files 
has to make a case that the proposed invention was not known beforehand. 
31 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. (2010),  available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-964.pdf,  upheld a 
Federal Circuit  Court of Appeals decision invalidating a patent for an algorithm to hedge weather-related risk. The 
Federal Circuit  is the part of the judicial branch that handles patent cases, through courts with specialized judges. 
32 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149  F. 3d 1368  (1998). 
33 It would be interesting to know if Netflix  had any expectation of patenting the result.   Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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They also suggest  a framework  or matrix  in which  they can be compared with other methods for 
inducing  innovation  and procuring  goods and services  generally. 
The first  difference  involves  specificity.  The patent system  is intrinsically  wide open. 
Although  patent law includes  some provisions  for pharmaceuticals,  plants, and biotechnology,  it 
is essentially  equally  open to any new, useful,  and non-obvious  process or machine.  Prizes, on 
the other hand, are employed  only  for achieving  a highly  particular  goal. This is not only  a 
matter of choice by the holder of the prize competition,  but is a requirement  for having  a prize. A 
clear set of ―victory  conditions,‖  as Kalil  (2006) put it, is necessary to provide  ex ante assurance 
to contestants  that they know what they have to accomplish  to win the prize and avoid  ex post 
litigation  over the winner. 
The second difference  involves  risk bearing.  Those undertaking  research initiatives  that 
may lead to patented products bear risks on both sides of the profit  equation.  On the cost side, 
they bear the full  expense of developing  a patentable  process or machine  and the risk that they 
will  not win the patent race. On the benefit  side, they bear the full  risk regarding  the eventual 
demand for and economic  value of the innovation.  Unless up-front  costs and future  profitability 
are highly  correlated, having  to bear both adds to the risk potential  inventors  bear relative  to 
bearing  one or the other alone. With prizes, on the other hand, one side of the risk, the benefit 
risk, is shifted  to some degree away from the potential  inventors  because some return—the 
prize—is  guaranteed,  along with  any ancillary  or indirect  benefits  of winning. 
These differences  suggest  a potential  matrix  of possibilities,  based on specificity  of the 
innovation  sought  (columns)  and the degree to which  the solicitor  of the innovation,  public  or 
private, would reduce uncertainty-related  costs by bearing  some of the risk (rows):
34 
                                                 
34 The placement of prizes in the ―known objective; shared risk‖ box is consistent with Rogerson‘s (1989) 
characterization of cost-plus rewards in defense contracting. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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All risks borne by 
potential innovators 
Patents   
Risks shared with 
innovation solicitor 
  Prizes 
The blank regions  in the matrix  invite  consideration  of what might  go in them. For the 
lower-left  box, a good candidate  would be grants in response to requests for proposals from a 
general  research support agency,  most likely  but not necessarily  public.  For those, the objective 
is relatively  unspecified,  in the sense that research teams have the flexibility  to propose potential 
research ideas, at least within  reasonably  broad categories.  The solicitor  shares the risk, not on 
the benefit  side as with  prizes, but by covering  all or a substantial  fraction  of the costs of the 
research. 
The blank box on the upper right  lacks, so far, an obvious institutional  arrangement  that 
fits. It describes a setting  in which  the solicitor  knows what it wants done but the potential 
suppliers  absorb all the risk. To clarify  what it might  mean, it is useful  to subdivide  the ―Known 
Objective‖  column  into two. One covers settings  in which  the solicitor  knows the objective it 
wants to achieve  but does not know or have a technological  solution.  The second covers 
circumstances  where the solicitor  knows what it wants and also how to solve the problem.  The 
amended table, filling  in the lower left  box with research grants, is: 
 






All risks borne by 
potential innovators 
Patents     




Prizes   
If the solicitor  knows what it wants and how to get it, and the risks associated are best 
borne by the suppliers,  then it can simply  purchase solutions  to its problems  ―off  the shelf;‖  that 
acquisition  method can go in the upper right  box. If the market risk in supplying  those solutions Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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needs to be shared, it can purchase those goods through  a procurement  contract specifying  terms 
of purchase and delivery;  that goes in the lower right  box. This  leaves the upper middle  box, 
which  would seem to fit  most a setting  where the solicitor  with a known objective  makes that 
objective  known to the market, perhaps with  the expectation  that suppliers  are willing  to bear the 
risk because of the potential  gains from any subsequent  patents or market opportunities.  This 
may be labeled, for lack of a better term, ―Market solutions.‖  The complete matrix  of innovation 
acquisition  method thus becomes:   
 






All risks borne by 
potential innovators 








Prizes  Procurement  
contracts 
This suggests  a potential  formal  approach to the prizes vs. patent question.  One might  be 
able to model the choice of innovation  acquisition  method formally  as a function  of, first,  the 
relative  knowledge  the solicitor  or customer knows about its objective and the technological 
means for addressing  it, and second, the relative  cost of risk to the solicitor  and the potential 
innovators.  Such a model could improve  on the limits  in the present literature  that either treat 
patents as no more than a prize or treat prizes as no more than a patent buyout. 
Conclusions, So Far 
Prizes have long  been a method for encouraging  innovation  and have recently  become 
more prominent.  Economic  models generally  fail  to explain  why they would be chosen over 
other methods for encouraging  innovation,  particularly  patents. The effect  of patenting  on 
innovation  is modeled as if patents were prizes, so those models cannot identify  advantages  of 
one over the other. Other models  have analogized  prices to patent buyouts,  but that analogy  fails. 
Theoretical  analysis  of the putative  advantages  of lump-sum  payments  for innovation  neglects 
the distortions  in other market necessary to raise the funds  to make those payments.  Patent 
buyouts  also would  be difficult  to implement  because the government  is unlikely  to have 
adequate information  to come up with appropriate compensation  that would stimulate  optimal 
investment.   Resources for the Future  Brennan, Macauley, and Whitefoot 
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Prizes have a number  of idiosyncratic  advantages  over patents, especially  their  design 
flexibility  and ability  to cover non-patentable  achievements.  A potentially  fruitful  approach to 
understanding  the difference  between patents and prizes builds  on a matrix  of methods to induce 
innovation  based on the degree of knowledge  the solicitor  has regarding  the objective  and how to 
meet it as well  as the degree to which  the solicitor  should  share in risk bearing.  Our aspiration  is 
that future  work will  develop a formal  model  of these relationships  and clarify  the reasons for 
choosing  between patents and prizes. 
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